The 'single' Equality Act 2010 was intended to unify and simplify British discrimination law which had grown up piecemeal over 40 years. However, a number of protections did not follow the standard model (as originally laid down in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) and remained outside the unification process. Such grounds include Trade Union membership and the possession of whistleblower status and past criminal records. This difference has been significant in the government's reaction to the European Court of Human Rights' decision in Redfearn v UK regarding membership of political parties where the government opted to expand these 'other' protections rather than amend the Equality Act 2010. This article considers the role and status of these other discriminations which remain outside the Equality Act 2010 in light of the government's response to Redfearn.
Introduction
There was, and is, no general equality principle within British anti-discrimination law.
Rather, as Fredman wrote in 2001, there was 'a relatively sophisticated set of antidiscrimination statutes [which] operates within a narrow area ' (2001: 149) . Over the years since then the set of statutes grew in number and scope and in 2008 the government noted that there were 'nine major pieces of discrimination legislation, around 100 statutory instruments setting out connected rules and regulations and more than 2,500 pages of guidance and statutory codes of practice' (Government Equalities Office, 2008: 6) . In place of this myriad web, they proposed instead a single piece of legislation, somewhat misleadingly described by some as the single equality act, 1 which in the words of the Long Title would 'restate the greater part of the enactments relating to discrimination and harassment related to certain personal characteristics'.
The restatement within the Equality was primarily intended to simplify, and to varying extents, unify, harmonise and strengthen, the British anti-discrimination statute book and related guidance.
2 While it has, indeed, unified much of the law and race (including colour, nationality and ethnic and national origins), disability, religion or belief (including non-belief), sexual orientation and age. 6 From the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 through to the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, they followed a broadly standard model, albeit one which allowed for a host of significant, and insignificant, differences and which evolved over time. The legislation outlawed certain activities (either covering a wide range of fields e.g. discrimination in employment, in the provision of goods and services, in housing, etc.
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or just one or others of those) 7 having first defined discrimination using variants of a standard formula. 8 The Equality has followed the format of the precursor legislation and ironed out some (but not all) of the differences. Thus then and now, direct discrimination refers to less favourable treatment on protected 'grounds' or 'because of a protected characteristic' (while the words have changed to the latter, the meaning is explicitly the same). 9 The Equality Act 2010 did, however, replace the former distinction whereby sex and age direct discrimination had to be because of the claimant's own characteristic whereas race, religion and sexual orientation discrimination could be because of another's characteristic (i.e. discrimination by association). 10 Then and formulation in preference to 'on grounds of'). Victimisation has, however, undergone a more radical change in definition; it is now where someone is subjected to a detriment because of their doing something under the act (such as bringing or helping with proceedings or alleging a contravention) rather than where someone is treated less favourably on similar grounds, thereby, some say, taking it outside the realm of discrimination. 11 The Equality Act 2010 then goes on to render discrimination, harassment and victimisation unlawful when undertaking particular activities, such as Not only does the format remain broadly the same, a number of distinctions between the characteristics have also been copied over. Disability retains its unique identity, having special provisions requiring reasonable adjustments and providing for discrimination arising from a disability (which can be justified) 12 along with it being a protected characteristic for direct and, now, indirect discrimination; pregnancy/maternity also has some special provisions and is expressly excluded from being a protected characteristic for indirect discrimination and for harassment and potentially excluded from direct discrimination; 13 marriage/civil partnership, while listed among the protected characteristics in section 4, is frequently excluded from provisions; 14 and age remains the sole protected characteristic for which justification is available to defeat a direct discrimination claim. 15 The former legislation, while introducing harassment across much of the board (excluding marriage/civil partnership and pregnancy/maternity), did not render religion or belief and sexual orientation harassment unlawful per se with regard to the provision of goods and services, the disposal and management of premises and school (but not further or While the aim to simplify and unify discrimination law was, in some ways, ambitious, the government generally eschewed any major changes (such as making single-sex clubs unlawful for fear of causing the legislation to be blocked; something which the minister responsible appears now to regret). 21 The government thus opted to retain the closed-list approach to discrimination, whereby characteristics are specifically approach has meant that for both charters, to take two examples, sexual orientation and marital status have received charter protection. 22 While such an approach can allow for protection to be extended where considered judicious, it does carry with it the risk of uncertainty and confusion which has been a hallmark of the European
Court's inconsistent generosity in interpretation. other means, and with an order set to be laid in 2015 bringing it into effect. This, however, will not make it the 10 th protected characteristic but will add caste alongside colour, nationality and ethnic or national origins as an aspect of race. 24 Not only were the range of grounds within the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, such as political opinion, language, genetic features and property, not brought into UK law (in line with the UK having 'opted out'), 25 
existing protections from less
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Conduct -blowing the whistle and past misbehavior
The protection against detriment due to whistle-blowing or past misbehavior could be said not to relate to inherent characteristics of the person (such as their sex, race, orientation, age, etc.) but instead relate to something they have done (in one case creditable and the other discreditable but historic).
Protection for 'whistle-blowers' was brought in by the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA 1998). The protection operates through the Employment Rights Act
1996, with the 1998 Act inserting definitions as to what is a protected disclosure, in
terms of what the worker must reasonably believe to qualify for protection and to whom it is made, and rights regarding not suffering a detriment and unfair dismissal.
The worker must reasonably believe that the disclosure would show that a criminal offence has been or is likely to be committed, that a person has failed or is likely to fail to comply with a legal obligation, that a miscarriage of justice has occurred or is There has been some criticism of the Act and its working. The charity Public Concern at Work organised an independent commission to review whistleblowing which reported in November 2013. 31 While PIDA 1998 was described as 'indispensible', concern was expressed that it was a retrospective protection and this only indirectly supports whistleblowing. 32 A pro-active system of encouragement and reporting requirements along with clear government advice and simplification of the law are among the recommendations. 33 Lewis has proposed system of mediation to allow for more effective resolution to whistleblowing disputes. 34 The government have already acted to amend the law inserting a public interest requirement (as some were citing breaches of their employment contract as a failure to comply with a legal obligation and thus benefit from the disapplication of the qualifying period and cap on policy paper, considered that the remedy for such a breach, particularly as regards not appointing someone, was unclear. While a public authority could be subject to 46 This dichotomy between 'in employment' discrimination and discrimination against applicants emerges again with regard to 'membership' discrimination (below). In his conclusion Pitt-Payne suggests that the 1974 Act should be replaced and that an approach based on discrimination law should be adopted. 47 This would provide greater and clearer protection and it could easily be added as an additional protected characteristic but employers would still need to be aware of the other elements currently covered by the 1974 Act such as the definition of spent convictions and the consequences of unauthorised disclosure of them. 48 
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Membership -not a defining characteristic?
There is a clear difference between inherent personal characteristics such as one's sex, race or disability and membership of a trade union or political party or group.
Arguably, the line is less clear with regard to religion or belief (where, for example, belief in the urgent necessity to act to mitigate climate change and to prevent foxhunting have been held to be protected beliefs). 49 54 There is, however, a stark difference between these provisions as written: unlike section 137 they expressly refer to 'trade union membership or activities' and contain particular paragraphs concerning taking part in trade union activities, and making use of their services, at an appropriate time.
55
A literal interpretation of these provisions would thus suggest that there is no protection for an applicant who is refused employment because of his or her past or probable future trade union activities whereas once in employment he or she would be so protected. A further difference can be discerned as to on whom the burden of proof lies. As regards applicants, section 137 is silent and so the burden lies with the claimant. Section 152 provides a remedy for dismissal via the unfair dismissal mechanism, amending it to remove the requirement of qualifying service and providing for special compensation, and so the burden is as provided for under unfair dismissal (that it is the employer who has to show the reason for the dismissal). The provisions dealing with detriment short of dismissal (sections 146-151) include the for similar protection as in section 137 but includes an Equality Act-like burden of proof provision under which the burden shifts to the prospective employer once facts have been shown from which the tribunal could conclude, in the absence of any other explanation, that there had been a contravention. 58 However, the law regarding the difference between membership and activities can be said to be unsettled following national and European judicial intervention.
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The Employment Appeal Tribunal has held that, notwithstanding the statutory wording or lack of it, 'a divorce of the fact of membership and the incidents of membership is illusory… [p]articipation in the activities of a union is one of the ways in which membership of a union is manifested', 59 although having said that while they EAT, looking at predecessor legislation, had previously drawn a distinction between membership and the 'fruits of membership'. 60 The Court of Appeal reversed this decision and was itself reversed by the House of Lords who drew a distinction between deterring or penalising membership and deterring the use of some of the union's services. 61 To quote Lord Bridge:
a general proposition of law that, ... membership of a union is to be equated with using the "essential" services of that union, at best it puts an unnecessary and imprecise gloss on the statutory language, at worst it is liable to distort the meaning of these provisions which protect union membership as such. placed under unacceptable pressure to do so, had acted solely in a negative response to that pressure rather than because of their membership or activities. As the Blacklist Regulations were also in play and they cover activities and membership, the EAT were not addressed on the question of whether section 137 extended to activities, on which Underhill J noted there was a good deal of law. 65 However, he does refer to 'activities' rather than membership in his conclusion. 66 The reference to manifestation of union membership echoes the situation with regard to religion or belief. While the right to have a religion is absolute under Article 9(1) ECHR, the freedom to manifest it is conditional under Article 9(2) as it may have an impact on others. 67 As there is no distinction between direct and indirect discrimination in the ECHR one may think that in national law holding a belief falls into the direct category whereas questions of manifestation would lead to an indirect claim. Manifestation is certainly covered, a contention fortified following the case of 
Membership and Redfearn
Redfearn concerned the dismissal of a minibus driver for the disabled following his election as a local councillor for the British National Party (which was then a whitesonly party committed to reversing non-white immigration The impolitic implications of this would, it is contended, have most likely led to the political opinion characteristic joining age as a protected characteristic for which justification of direct discrimination could be available. This in turn could have led to the seemingly inherent conflict between religion and belief and sexuality -already marked in the exclusion of them from some of the harassment provisions -being resoluble thorough those two characteristics joining the list of characteristics where direct discrimination could be justified. 84 In such circumstances, and even if it stopped short of going that far, there would be a stronger case to bring trade union membership and past criminal offences into the fold as is the case in other jurisdictions.
As things stand, however, with the government having opted to amend the protection 
